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STATEMENT

OF

JURISDICTION

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to
Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended).

The Utah

Supreme Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT
I.

OF

THE

ISSUES

Whether or not the trial court erred in failing to grant

plaintiff's motion to set aside pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 60(b) where good cause in support thereof was
shown and judgment was the result of either (a) the trial court's
failure to realize that plaintiffs had filed a brief relative to
the motion in question, or

(b) plaintiffs' reliance upon the

statements of the trial court as to the opportunity to complete
discovery.
The decision of the trial court under Rule 60(b) is reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard. "Where there is doubt about
whether

a default

should be set aside, the doubt

should be

resolved in favor of doing so, to the end that each party may have
an opportunity to present his side of the controversy and that
there be a resolution

in accordance with

law and justice."

Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. Aala Dev. Corp.. 611 P.2d 369, 371
(Utah 1980). [R. 193-194]
II.

Whether or not the trial court erred in granting summary

judgment where plaintiff had established as an undisputed fact
1

that insurance proceeds were wrongfully paid to defendant and
where any other fact that would have supported summary judgment
were at the very least in dispute.
The standard of review on summary judgment requires that all
facts and inferences be construed in favor of the party against
whom summary judgment was entered.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,

Rule 56; Jackson v. Dabnev, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982); Bowen
v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982) ; Beehive Brick Co. v.
Robinson Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827 (Utah App. 1988).
STATUTES,

ORDINANCES

AND

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56.

[R. 195]

RULES
(A copy of Rule 56 is

attached as Addendum, Exhibit "E.")
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b). (A copy of Rule 60 is
attached as Addendum, Exhibit "E.")
STATEMENT

OF

THE

CASE

Defendant Knudson initiated a foreclosure against the Subject
Property, described below.
his execution was wrongful.

He did so with the full knowledge that
He did so with the knowledge that the

title to the Subject Property was covered by title insurance, and
with the intent that he could recover insurance proceeds without
discovery by the insurer of the wrongful nature of the execution.
In its capacity as insurer, in order to prevent execution
against the Subject Property, Attorneys' Title Guaranty Fund, Inc.
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("ATGF") paid money to defendant Knudson to stop the execution.
Following the sale, ATGF investigated its subrogation rights and
subsequently obtained documents showing that the execution was
wrongfully brought by David Knudson.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann.,

Section 38-9-1, ATGF provided the same information and demanded
that David Knudson correct the damages resulting from his wrongful
lien on the subject property.
to do so.

Mr. Knudson has failed and refused

Subsequently, ATGF brought an action against defendant

Knudson for wrongful lien, slander of title and restitution of the
insurance money wrongfully paid.
ATGF brought a motion for summary judgment against David
Knudson.
judgment.

Defendant Knudson filed a cross motion for summary
The trial court indicated that it was interested in

having further evidence of the knowledge of Mr. Knudson at the
time he foreclosed on the property.

ATGF informed the trial court

that if the trial court considered the element of knowledge at the
time of the execution to be important, then the individual who
sold the judgment to Mr. Knudson would provide an affidavit that
Mr. Knudson was informed of the release of the property from the
judgment at the time that Mr. Knudson purchased the judgment.
Significantly,

defendant

Knudson never

sought

to dispute

by

affidavit or other evidence the pleadings stating that he had the
knowledge in question, but in support of his cross motion for
3

summary judgment merely relied upon the absence of an affidavit
from plaintiffs at the time.

The trial court stated that it would

not render a decision on either motion for summary judgment until
the completion of discovery.
Subsequently, the trial court apparently lost track of the
status of the case and entered

summary judgment

in favor of

defendant Knudson on the apparent basis that plaintiffs had failed
to timely file a memorandum in opposition to the motion.

A series

of pleadings were filed in order to clarify the situation.
affidavit

in question and other documents

further

The

supporting

summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs were also filed.

However,

the trial court declined to set aside its order granting summary
j udgment.
STATEMENT

OF

FACTS

The procedural facts and the disputed and undisputed material
facts presented to the trial court, and which are relevant to this
appeal, consisted of the following:
1.

The real property which constitutes the subject matter

of this dispute is located at 1159 South 900 West, Salt Lake City,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 84104

(the "Subject Property").

(Unless specified otherwise, all references to the record in this
statement of facts are to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgments

4

dated

December

20,

199

and

the

memorandum

and

supporting

evidence.) [R. 55]
2.

Prior to plaintiffs' ownership of the Subject Property,

the same was subject to a judgment against a prior owner of the
property, Margaret Wendler Hill, filed April 2, 1991 and docketed
April 9, 1991 as No. 2164604, in the amount of $10,564.91 (the
"Judgment").
3.
defendant

[R. 55]

On or about August 12, 1991, the holder of the Judgment,
Guaranty

National

Ins. Co., released

the

Subject

Property with respect to the Judgment. [R. 55]
4.

In the summer of 1995, defendant

Knudson

contacted

defendant Guaranty National Ins. Co. and requested that he be
permitted to purchase the Judgment.

[Affidavit of Karen James,

paragraph 3.] [R. 215, 248]
5.

Karen James, an employee of defendant Guaranty National

Ins. Co., expressly

informed defendant Knudson

that Guaranty

National Ins. Co. had released the Subject Property as to the
Judgment and defendant Knudson acknowledge the same.
of Karen James, paragraph 5.][R. 215, 249]

[Affidavit

The files of Guaranty

National Ins. Co. as to the judgment, containing the release and
partial satisfaction and so forth, were all available to defendant
Knudson.

Nevertheless, defendant Knudson expressly stated that he

5

was unconcerned with the release and failed to request the file.
[Affidavit of Karen James, paragraphs 5 and 6.][R. 215, 249]
6.

Defendant Knudson purchased the Judgment from defendant

Guaranty National Ins. Co. for the sum of $1,000.00.

[Affidavit

of Karen James, paragraph 5.] [R. 215, 249]
7.

Thereafter,

defendant

Knudson

purporting

to

have

obtained an assignment of the judgment, initiated a foreclosure
action against the Subject Property and, on or about September 19,
1995, recorded a notice of sheriff's levy against the Subject
Property. [R. 55]
8.
received

Plaintiffs Rollins and their insurer ATGF subsequently
notice

Property.

of

the

sheriff's

levy

against

In order to prevent execution against

the

Subject

the Subject

Property to the detriment of a subsequent purchaser, plaintiffs,
on or about November 29, 1995, paid defendant Knudson the amount
of $11,514.91
$10,564.91

for

in satisfaction of the Judgment, consisting of
the

judgment,

$700.00

in attorney's

fees

to

defendant Knudson's attorney and $250.00 as the costs of the
sheriff's sale. [R. 55-56]
9.

On or about August 22, 1996, plaintiffs made written

demand upon defendant Knudson to correct his wrongful lien, as
defined in Utah Code Ann., Section 38-9-1. [R. 56]
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10.

Defendant Knudson failed and refused to correct the

damages

caused by his wrongful

knowledge

imparted

by

the

lien, notwithstanding

above

described

demand

actual
letter.

[R. 56]
11.

On

or

about

February

7,

1997

the

plaintiffs

and

defendant Knudson appeared before the trial court to argue cross
motions for summary judgment.
7, 1997.

[See trial court docket, February

A true and correct copy of the trial court docket is

attached hereto as Exhibit "A."][R. 273]
12.

Based on an affidavit filed by plaintiffs, pursuant to

Utah Rules

of Civil

Procedure, Rule

56(f),

declined to render a decision at that time.

the

trial

court

The trial court

directed that parties should complete discovery and then bring
their motions again.

At the hearing, the Trial Court expressly

stated

judgment would

that

summary

discovery was completed.

not be ruled upon

until

No deadline was set and the Court's

statement was not qualified in any way.

The complete statement of

the Court was the summary judgment would not be ruled upon until
discovery was complete.

[See trial court docket, January 31,

1997, February 7, 1997 and February 25, 1997.][R. 273]
13.

Before plaintiffs had completed the intended discovery

and refiled their motion for summary judgment, defendant Knudson

7

attempted to resubmit his motion for summary judgment.

[See trial

court docket, February 10, 1997.][R. 273]
14.

Again, the trial court issued a minute entry, dated

February 25, 1997, expressly stating that the trial court would
not rule on defendant Knudson's cross-motion for summary judgment
until the completion of discovery for both motions. Counsel for
plaintiffs and appellants also reviewed the docket of the case
thereafter.

The entry in the docket for February 25, 1997 states,

"The Court will not rule on deft. Knudson's cross-motion

for

summary judgment until the completion of discovery has been done
for both motions." [See trial court docket, February 25, 1997.]
[R. 273]
15.
yet again.
16.

On May 21, 1997, defendants filed a notice to submit,
[See trial court docket, May 21, 1997.] [R. 273]
In

response,

plaintiffs

filed

another

Rule

56(f)

affidavit for the purpose of advising the trial court that they
were still engaged in discovery.

[See trial court docket, May 28,

1997.][R. 273]
17.

Without further opportunity for plaintiffs to be heard,

the trial court granted defendant Knudson's motion for summary
judgment.

[See trial court docket, May 29, 1997; Order, dated

July 7, 1997, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto
as Exhibit "B."][R. 180-182, 274]
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18.
filed a

Plaintiffs

completed necessary discovery

and

timely

motion pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule

60(b) to set aside the summary judgment, dated September 9. 1997.
The Rule 60(b) motion was supported by an accompanying memorandum
as well as additional evidence developed and plaintiffs' motion
for summary judgment addressing the merits of the case.

[See

trial court docket, September 10, 1997 the Motions and Memoranda,
dated September 9, 1997] [R. 189-250]
19.

On September 25, 1997, the trial court issued a minute

entry stating that it found that plaintiffs had missed a deadline
under Rule 4-501, C.J.A. and that missing such a deadline was an
insufficient basis to set aside the summary judgment.

[A true and

correct copy of the minute entry is attached hereto as Exhibit
"C."][R. 265-267]
20.

Notwithstanding plaintiffs' efforts

to bring to the

Court's attention that (1) no deadlines were missed, and (2) that
the sole reason that plaintiff's further evidence and motion for
summary judgment was not earlier presented was due to reliance on
the trial court's earlier statements that the parties

should

complete discovery before a decision would be rendered, the trial
court

entered

an

Order,

dated

plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) motion.

October

26,

1997,

denying

[A true and correct copy of the

Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "D."][R. 238-285]
9

SUMMARY

OF

THE

ARGUMENT

The trial court should have granted plaintiffs' Rule 60(b)
Motion

to

Set

Aside

the

order

in

question.

The

standard

articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in Interstate Excavating,
Inc. v. Aala Dev. Corp., 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980) was clearly met
by plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs' counsel was clearly taken by surprise

by the ruling of the trial court which came after the trial court
had expressly informed the parties that a ruling would not be made
until the completion of discovery.
lost

track

of

the

case

judgment as a default.

and

The trial court had apparently

erroneously

entered

the

summary

The Rule 60(b) motion was timely filed and

supported by pleadings showing that plaintiffs would prevail on
the merits of the case.
The summary judgment in question was in error in any event.
Plaintiffs actually filed the initial motion for summary judgment
and provided

evidence

of undisputed

facts entitling

judgment on the merits against defendant Knudson.

them

to

It was an

undisputed fact from the outset that insurance money had been
wrongfully paid to defendant.

Therefore, summary judgment could

never have been rendered in favor of defendant.

In response to

the request of the trial court a further affidavit establishing
the knowledge of the defendant was later provided.

The trial

court was informed of this affidavit from the outset.

Defendant

10

never submitted evidence as to his knowledge at the time of the
execution in question, thus, never placing plaintiffs under the
burden of producing the counter affidavit in question.

In any

event, because it was apparent that plaintiffs would prevail on
the merits of the action, the standard for summary judgment was
never met by defendant Knudson.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS'
RULE 60(b) MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT IN QUESTION,
In support of their Rule 60(b) motion, plaintiffs submitted
to the trial court the Affidavit of Karen James, which affidavit
proved the allegations of plaintiffs' various causes of action
against defendant David Knudson, dba Knute IV, LLC.
[R. 189-250; 248-249]
Also submitted to the trial court in conjunction with the
Rule 60(b) motion was a motion for leave to file amended
complaint, memorandum in support and proposed second amended
complaint, a motion for summary judgment and memorandum in
support, and plaintiffs' first set of discovery to defendant David
Knudson.

[R. 189-250]

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b) provides in
pertinent part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in
the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal

11

representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect ....
There is a strong preference in the law that cases be decided
upon their merits.

The Utah Supreme Court stated in Interstate

Excavating, Inc. v. Aala Dev. Corp., 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980),
"where there is doubt about whether a default should be set aside,
the doubt should be resolved in favor of doing so, to the end that
each party may have an opportunity to present his side of the
controversy and that there be a resolution in accordance with law
and justice."

Id.

at 371.

In the present case, plaintiff was attentive to the matter.
Counsel timely filed Rule 56(f) affidavits and objected to the
proposed summary judgment prior to its entry.

The trial court had

already stated would permit plaintiff to complete discovery and
respond appropriately in the matter without a decision being
rendered on summary judgment.

The trial court had specifically

not set a time limit within which the affidavit of Karen James and
the pleadings needed to be submitted.
A reasonably prudent person would have relied upon the
statements of the trial court that, "The Court will not rule on
deft. Knudson's cross-motion for summary judgment until the
completion of discovery has been done for both motions."
statement of facts, above, nos. 2 and 3.

12

See

Counsel for plaintiffs and appellants were engaged in
discovery and acting with reasonable diligence. Counsel acted in
a timely fashion in completing discovery, advising the trial court
that discovery was continuing and in making a Rule 60(b) motion.
See statement of facts, above, nos. 5, 6 and 7.
Perhaps another attorney would have acted with greater
dispatch that this counsel. However, this counsel was completely
taken aback both by the entry of summary judgment and by the
failure of the trial court to grant to Rule 60(b) motion. This
counsel would certainly have acted with greater dispatch had their
been indication that the Court had a deadline in mind after
indicating directly to counsel that discovery was to be completed
and both the motion for summary judgment and the cross-motion for
summary judgment were to be again submitted together for ruling by
the Court.

This counsel acted with all possible diligence in

completing that discovery and timely filing a Rule 60(b) motion
together with the further evidence and motion for summary
judgment.
The trial court's decision to deny plaintiffs and appellants
Rule 60(b) motion was an abuse of discretion.

This counsel has no

objection to being held to a deadline. This counsel has no
objection to the entry of a default when a party fails to respond
at all. However, there is something very arbitrary in refusing to
13

set aside a default where (1) there is reason for counsel to
believe that a deadline has not been set, (2) counsel has timely
communicated with the trial court prior to the entry of default,
and (3) following default counsel has timely acted to remedy every
element of the default—including the presentation of the merits.
Until the trial court actually denied plaintiffs' motion to
set aside judgment, counsel believed that the judgment was
rendered to dispose of the matter only if plaintiffs did not
timely prepare the further matters submitted and make a motion to
set aside the judgment.

Counsel would not have guessed that the

trial court would refuse to set aside the judgment where no
deadline had been given and counsel had been attentive enough to
file a Rule 56(f) affidavit advising the trial court that
plaintiffs were still engaged in discovery.
Summary judgment was entered in the matter as the result of
plaintiffs' excusable neglect.

The above described affidavits and

pleadings were not earlier filed primarily as a result of the fact
that no deadlines had been set for submission thereof and
plaintiff was unaware of the need to earlier file the same.
Plaintiffs submitted two Rule 56(e) affidavits, including one just
a few days prior to the entry of summary judgment.
court docket attached hereto as Exhibit "A."]
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[See trial

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT DAVID KNUDSON BASED ON
THE MERIT'S OF THE CASE.

Plaintiff submitted evidence and further pleadings sufficient
not only to defeat the summary judgment, but in fact to obtain a
summary judgment as against defendant Knudson.

[R. 51-76; 115-

143; 189-250] The merits of the case are such that it would be
unjust to permit summary judgment to stand in favor of defendant
Knudson, where the summary judgment is the result of excusable
neglect and not a decision of the merits as more fully presented.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56, governing the entry
of summary judgment, has been addressed extensively by the courts.
It is a matter of blackletter law that summary judgment should be
granted only when it clearly appears that there is no reasonable
probability that the party moved against could prevail.

Frisbee

v. K&K Const. Co., 676 P.2d 387, 389-90 (Utah 1984); FMA
Acceptance Co. v. Leatherbv Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1979).
All facts and inferences must be construed in a light most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgement.

Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure, Rule 56; Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615
(Utah 1982); Bowen v. Riverton Citv. 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah
1982); Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827, 831
(Utah App. 1988).

15

A. David Knudson Is Liable For Uniust Enrichment And ATGF Is
Entitled To Restitution.
Plaintiffs' most significant Cause of Action concerns the
right of the insurance company to recover insurance money
wrongfully paid.

Utah law requires the repayment of insurance

money wrongfully paid.

In Utah State Dept. of Social Servs. v.

Toscano, 624 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1981), the Supreme Court required
repayment of financial assistance made on the basis of a factual
error. [R. 138]

In so holding, the Supreme Court cited the

Restatement of Restitution.
Restatement of Restitution, section 23, at 101, states,
(1) A person is entitled to restitution from another to whom
he has paid his own money because of the erroneous belief
induced by mistake of fact,
(a) that he was thereby performing the terms of a contract
between a third person and the payee, which contract
never existed, or had been avoided or otherwise
discharged, or
(b) that he was performing a noncontractual duty owed by a
third person to the payee, which duty was not owed, or
(c) that an excessive amount paid was required for the
performance of a duty, contractual or otherwise, owed by
a third person to the payee.
Comment b. states,
The rule stated in this section applies both were the payor
would have had a duty to the third person to make the payment
if the facts were as the payor believed, as in the case of an
insurer, and ...
(emphasis added).

[R. 138-139] For the requirements in other

specific circumstances, see also 66 Am Jur 2d, Restitution and

16

Implied Contracts, section 13 (mistake), section 118 (money paid
by mistake), section 121 (mistake of fact as to title, authority
or quantity). [R. 139]
In the present case, defendant Knudson admitted from the very
outset that the insurance money was wrongfully paid.

[R. 98-101]

ATGF paid money to defendant Knudson on the mistaken belief that
the property, and thus the owners and warrantors thereof, were
responsible for the judgment in question. According to the
Restatement, and Utah law, ATGF is entitled to restitution.
Defendant paid only $1,000.00 to Guaranty National Ins. Co.
for purchase of the Judgment. Clearly, defendant Knudson has been
unjustly enriched by the greatly disproportionate amount of money
wrongfully paid by the insurance company.
In this case, the insurance company acted on a mistaken
belief. Defendant Knudson, on the other hand, knew or should have
known that he was not entitled execute against the Subject
Property and that he was not entitled to the insurance money paid.
B. The Documents Recorded By David Knudson In Connection With The
Sheriffs' Sale Constituted A Wrongful Lien.
Utah Code Ann., Section 38-9-1, provides:
A person who claims an interest in, or a lien or encumbrance
against, real property, who causes or has caused a document
asserting that claim to be recorded or filed in the office of
the county recorder, who knows or has reason to know that the
document is forged, groundless, or contains a material
misstatement or false claim, is liable to the owner or title
17

holder for $1,000 or for treble damages, whichever is greater,
and for reasonable attorney fees, and costs as provided in
this chapter, if he willfully refuses to release or correct
such document of record within 20 days from the date of
written request from the owner or beneficial title-holder of
the real property. This chapter is not intended to be
applicable to mechanics' or materialmen's liens.
David Knudson received a letter from ATGF on or about August
22, 1996.

A copy of the Amended Complaint was included with the

letter, clearly describing the facts showing that the documents
recorded by David Knudson in furtherance of the Sheriff's sale
constituted a wrongful lien against the subject property.
Moreover, defendant Knudson was aware at the time of his wrongful
execution that he had initiated a wrongful execution.

All of the

information with respect thereto was available to defendant
Knudson, and he knew or should have known all of the details as to
the earlier release of the Subject Property as to the Judgment.
The undisputed evidence shows that the Subject Property was
released as to the Judgment, defined above, on or about August 12,
1991.

Therefore, execution against the Subject Property was

improper.
The Affidavit of Karen James shows that defendant Knudson was
aware at the time he initiated the execution against the Subject
Property that the Subject Property was released as to the
Judgment.

The Affidavit of Karen James also shows that the

information with respect to the release was fully available to
18

defendant Knudson at all relevant times, but that defendant
Knudson expressly declined to review the same.

Therefore,

defendant Knudson was aware at the time that execution against the
Subject Property was improper.
As further identified in the statement of facts, the
undisputed evidence further shows that defendant Knudson did file
an execution against the Subject Property on or about September
19, 1995, by recording a notice of sheriff's levy against the
Subject Property.
The undisputed evidence further shows that ATGF did suffer
damages in the amount of $11,514.91 as a result of the wrongful
lien.
It was further undisputed that defendant Knudson has failed
and refused to correct the damages caused by his wrongful lien
despite actual notice of the wrongful nature thereof.
Therefore, judgment must be rendered against David Knudson
for the damages caused by his wrongful lien.
C. David Knudson Is Liable For Slander Of Title.
As described above, defendant Knudson knew and should have
known that the documents he filed pursuant to his execution
against the Subject Property constituted false claims against the
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Subject Property, inasmuch as the Subject Property was released by
Guaranty National Ins. Co. as to the Judgment.
Defendant Knudson's own motion for summary judgment
challenged only the malice element of plaintiffs' cause of action
for Slander of Title.

Defendant Knudson asserted that plaintiffs

had not presented evidence sufficient to establish the malice
element.

The Affidavit of Karen James now satisfies the burden of

proof as to the element of malice.

The mere fact that the files

showing the release of the Judgment as to the Subject Property
were available to defendant Knudson and that he expressly ignored
them is sufficient to establish malice, as discussed below.
However, that is not the limit of defendant Knudson's malice.

He

was expressly informed of the release of the Subject Property, and
proceeded against the Subject Property notwithstanding--secure in
his belief that the insurance company would be unaware of the
release until he was paid off.
Utah case law discusses the application of term of ''malice"
as to an action for slander of title.

In Olsen v. Kidman, 235

P.2d 510, 512-13 (Utah 1951), the Supreme Court found that a
realtor committed a slander of title because the realtor did not
have the right to lien the property for his commission.

The

Supreme Court held that actual malice need not be present.

Id.

The Supreme Court stated, "As in an action for defamation, if the
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other essentials to liability are present, the publisher of the
disparaging matter takes the risk that it is untrue."

Id. at 513.

The Supreme Court made a finding of implied malice because the
lien on the property was improper, despite the realtor's honest
belief that it was permitted.

Id.

In the present case, defendant

Knudson knew or should have known that the subject property had
been released as to the judgment. Therefore, implied malice will
be found to exist.
In Gillmor v. Cumminas, 904 P.2d 703, 707-08 (Utah App.
1995), the Court upheld a judgment for slander of title, including
a finding of malice, in a case very much like the present case.
The defendant testified that he had access to the relevant records
describing the boundaries to his property.

Id. at 708. The

defendant hired a surveyor and used the descriptions generated by
the surveyor in deeds issued to a third party. Jd. at 705 and
708.

The surveyor testified that he was not given the relevant

records to assist him in surveying.

1^. at 708. The defendant

admitted that he did not check the conflicting legal descriptions
before using the incorrect legal descriptions created by the
surveyor.

Id. at 708. In the present case, defendant Knudson

similarly acted with disregard to the information known to him, or
which was available to him.

Even if defendant Knudson asserts

that he was not expressly told of the release by Karen James, the
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mere fact that he failed to obtain and review the file concerning
the Judgment is sufficient to satisfy the malice element, pursuant
to Gillmor v. Cumminas, supra.
CONCLUSION
Our system of justice provides a mechanism which allows
defaults to be set aside based on circumstances where an attorney
makes a mistake concerning a deadline or otherwise may not have
been as diligent as he should have been. This mechanism is
critical so that the parties themselves have fair opportunity for
their case to be heard.

Especially in a case such as this,

involving insurance fraud, the interests of justice require that
the merits be presented.

Counsel for plaintiffs and appellants

was not so lacking in diligence or justification so as to justify
penalizing the parties themselves.
Without regard to the foregoing, summary judgment should not
have been entered in this case.

Plaintiffs were entitled to

prevail, they provided adequate evidence in support of their
entitlement to proceed on the merits.

It was only upon an

oversight by the trial court that summary judgment was entered
without making reference to the evidence or the merits.
DATED this

day of December, 1998.

Thor B. Roundy
&
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL
Thor B. Roundy
275 East South Temple, Suite 150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 364-3229
Bar No. 6435
I, THOR B. ROUNDY, certify that on this _ J ^ _ f day of
December, 1998, I served four copies of the attached BRIEF OF THE
APPELLANT, Appellate Court No. 981423-CA, upon counsel for the
appellee in this matter by mailing it to him by first class mail
with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address:
Mark O. Morris
Snell &L Wilmer, LLP
111 E. Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

T^=

Thor B. Roundy
Attorney for Appellant
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3rd DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ATTORNEYS' TITLE GUARANTEE FUN vs. RAUL ALVA
CASE NUMBER 960903326 {Civil}

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
FRANK NOEL
PARTIES
Plaintiff - ATTORNEYS' TITLE GUARANTEE FUN
Represented by: THOR B ROUNDY
Defendant - RAUL ALVA
Represented by: MARK O MORRIS
Plaintiff - EDWARD ROLLINS
Represented by: THOR B ROUNDY
Plaintiff - SHANEN ROLLINS
Represented by: THOR B ROUNDY
Defendant - ELAINE ALVA
Represented by: MARK O MORRIS
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE

310.00
310.00
0.00
0.00

Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Credit:
Balance:

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC
Original Amount Due:
0.00
Amended Amount Due:
120.00
Amount Paid:
120.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL -TYPE: APPEAL
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

190.00
190.00
0.00
0.00

CASE NOTE
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CASE NUMBER 960903326

{Civil}

PROCEEDINGS
05-17
96 Filed: Complaint
05-17
96 Judge NOEL assigned.
conver
Total Due:
05-17 -96 Fee Account created
0.00
conver
05-17 -96 COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC
Payment Received:
120.00
susans
Note: CV FILING
05-17- •96 FILED: COMPLAINT
brenda
06-04- •96 FILED: SUMMONS ON RETURN-RAUL ALVA
brenda
06-04- •96 FILED: SUMMONS ON RETURN-ELAINE ALVA
brenda
08-21- •96 FILED AMENDED COMPLAINT
brenda
08-28- •96 FILED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF AMENDED COMPLAINT
patj
09-06- •96 FILED CHANGE OF ADDRESS NOTICE
brenda
10-10- •96 FILED
SUMMONS ON RETURN
brenda
10-15- •96 FILED ANSWER OF DEFT DAVID KNUDSON DBA KNUTE IV LLC
tinaa
10-18- •96 FILED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
brenda
12-20- •96 FILED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
brenda
12-20- •96 FILED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
brenda
12-20- •96 FILED
AFFIDAVIT OP THOR B ROUNDY
brenda
12-20- 96 FILED AFFIDAVIT OF BRIAN COLEMAN
brende
01-03- 97 FILED NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION
brendc
01-07- 97 FILED AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, MOTION FOR patj
01-07- 97
EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND
patj
01-07- 97
REQUEST FOR HEARING
patj
01-08- 97 FILED: RESPONSE TO AFFIDAVIT AND SECOND NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR
brendc
01-08- 97
DECISION
brendc
01-10- 97 FILED: MINUTE ENTRY - ORAL ARGUMENT IS GRANTED ON PLTF'S MOTION Jennie
01-10- 97
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
jennit
01-15- •97 FILED: NOTICE OF ENTRY OF APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL AND REQUEST
brendc
01-15- •97
FOR NOTICE-MARK MORRIS
brendc1
01-21- •97 FILED: NOTICE OF HEARING FOR 2/7/97 AT 9AM
brendc
01-21- •97 FILED: DEFENDANT DAVID KNUDSON DBA KNUTE IV LLC'S CROSS MOTION brendr
01-21- •97
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
brend;
01-21- •97 FILED: MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
brendi
01-21- •97
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN SUPPORT OF KNUDSON'S CROSS
brendi
01-21- •97
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
brendi
01-29- •97 FILED: REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
brendi
01-30- •97 FILED: RULE 56(F) AFFIDAVIT OF THOR B ROUNDY
brendi
OJ -30- •97 FILED* OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY
brend:
01-30- 97
JUDGMENT
brend
01-31- 97 FILED: RULE 56(F) AFFIDAVIT OF THOR B ROUNDY
brend
02-07- •97 Motion scheduled on February 07, 1997 at 09:00 AM in 3rd Floor
conve
Room 320 with Judge NOEL.
02-07- •97 FILED: MINUTE ENTRY-PLTF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT DENIED patj
patj
02-07- •97
WITH LEAVE TO FILE AGAIN
02-10- •97 FILED: REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF KNUDSON'S CROSS-MOTION FORbrend
02-10- •97
brend
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
02-10- •97 FILED: NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION
brend

Printed: 03/ o/^S
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02-25 -97 FILED : MINUTE ENTRY DECISION - THE COURT WILL NOT RULE ON DEFT Jennie
KNUDSON'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNTIL THE
02-25 -97
Jennie
COMPLETION OF DISCOVERY HAS BEEN DONE FOR BOTH MOTIONS
02-25 -97
Jennie
03-03 -97 FILED : ORDER
brenda
05-21-97 FILED : RENEWED NOTICE TO SUBMIT FQR DECISION
brenda
05-28 -97 FILED : RULE 56(F) AFFIDAVIT OF THOR B ROUNDY
brenda
05 -29 -97 FILED : MINUTE ENTRY DECISION - DEFT KNUDSON'S CROSS MOTION FOR Jennie
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED
05-29 -97
Jennie
06 -13 -97 FILED OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED ORDER OF SUMMARY
brenda
06 -13 -97
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DAVID KUNDSON MOTION FOR
brenda
06 -13 -97
RECONSIDERATION AND TO SET DISCOVERY DEADLINES
brenda
07 -07 -97 FILED ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DAVID KNUDSON
Jennie
07 -08 •97 FILED MINUTE ENTRY DECISION - PLTF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATIONjennie
07 -08 -97
IS DENIED; OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDG- Jennie
07 •08 -97
MENT IN FAVOR OF DAVID KNUDSON IS DENIED & ORDER SIGNED Jennie
07 •08 •97
AND ENTERED 7/7/97
Jennie
09 •10 •97 FILED: RULE 60(B) MOTION TO SET ASIDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
brenda
09 •10 •97 FILED: MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RULE 60(B) MOTION TO SET ASIDE brenda
09 •10 •97
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
brenda
09 •10 •97 FILED: MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT
brenda
09 •10 •97 FILED: MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
brenda
09- •10- •97
AMENDED COMPLAINT
brenda
09- •10- •97 FILED: SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
brenda
09- •10- •97 FILED: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
brenda
09- •10- •97 FILED: MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
brenda
09- 10- •97 FILED: CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
brenda
09- 15- •97 FILED: REPLY IN SUPPORT OF RULE 60(B) MOTION TO SET ASIDE
brenda
09- 15« •97
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE
brenda
09- 15- 97 FILED: NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION
brenda
09- 15« •97 FILED: MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO RULE 60(B) MOTION AND MOTION brenda
TO STRIKE
09- 15- 97
brenda
09- 18- 97 NOTE: FILE SENT TO JUDGE FOR RULING ON NOTICE TO SUBMIT
brenda
09- 25- 97 FILED: MINUTE ENTRY DECISION - PLFTS' MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE
Jennie
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS DENIED
09- 25- 97
Jennie
09- 30- 97 FILED: LETTER
patj
10- 02- 97 FILED: OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED ORDER DENYING
brenda
10- 02- 97
RULE 60 (B) MOTION AND GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE
brenda
10- 26- 97 FILED: RESPONSE TO PLTF'S OBJECTION TO PROPOSED ORDER DENYING
patj
10- 26- 97
RULE 60(B) MOTION
patj
10- 26- 97 FILED: ORDER DENYING RULE 60(B) MOTION AND GRANTING MOTION TO
patj
10- 26- 97
STRIKE
patj
11- 17- 97 FILED: EX PARTE RULE 54(B) MOTION FOR ORDER CERTIFYING JUDGMENT jbl
11- 17- 97
FOR APPEAL
jbl
11- 17- 97 FILED: MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RULE 54(B) MOTION FOR ORDER
jbl
11- 17- 97
jbl
CERTIFYING JUDGMENT FOR APPEAL
11- 17- 97 FILED: •UNSIGNED* ORDER CERTIFYING JUDGMENT FOR APPEAL
jbl
11- 18- 97 FILED: NOTICE OF PETITION FOR APPEAL
brenda
11- 19- 97 FILED: LETTER FROM MARK MORRIS
patj
11- 20- 97 FORWARDED CERT/COPY OF NOTICE OF PETITION FOR APPEAL TO
sophie
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)-97
SUPREME COURT
sophi<
11-20sophi*
11-24-97 FILED: LETTER FROM SUPREME COURT (INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL FILED
11-17-97 - S.C.#970545
11-24 -97
sophit'
12-01 97 Filed: memorandum in opposition to ex parte rule 54(b) motion
for order certifying judgment for appeal; and motion for
sanctions
patj
12-09-97 Filed: Reply in Support of Rule 54(B) Motion for Order
Certifying Judgment for Appeal Opposition to Motion for
Sanctions
brende'
12-12 -97 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision
brend^
12-12 97 NOTICE OF PETITION FOR APPEAL RETURNED BY SUPREME COURT IS NOT
NOTICE OF APPEAL SO DOCUMENT JUST FILED (COULD NOT TAKE OUT
BECAUSE OLD SYSTEM ENTRY) DOCKETED BY BRENDA K. ON 11-18-97
sophie
12-17-97 Filed: Minute entry: Oral argument on defendant Knudson's
Motion for Sanctions and Plaintiffs' Rule 54(b) Motion for Order
Certifying Judgment for Appeal approved.
helenp
Filed:
Minute
entry:
Plaintiffs
should
be
allowed
to
take
their
12-18 - 9 7
appeal; Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification granted.
helenp
98
Filed:
Letter
sent
to
counsel
voiding
Minute
Entry
of
12/17/97
01-12
approving oral argument on defendant Knudson's Motion.
helenp
01-21 - 9 8 Filed: LETTER FROM SUPREME COURT - S.C.#970545 - PETITION FOR
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL IS DENIED, AWARD OF ATTYS FEES DENIED
sophie
patj
01-28 98 Filed order: ORDER CERTIFYING JUDGMENT FOR APPEAL
Judge FRANK NOEL
Signed January 28, 1998
brende
0 2 - 0 9 98 Filed: Notice of Appeal
janm
Total Due:
190.00
0 2 - 0 9 - 9 8 Fee Account created
janm
02-09- 98 Filed: Notice of Appeal
janm
Payment Received:
02-09- 98 APPEAL
190.00
Note: Code Description: APPEAL
susanc
02-12- 98 Cert/copy of Notice of Appeal to Supreme Court
patj
02-19- 98 Filed: CERTIFICATE THAT NO TRANSCRIPT IS REQUIRED
02-24- 98 Filed: Letter from Supreme CourtONotice of Appeal received - New
case number is 980085
susanc
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Mark 0. Morris (A4636)
Daniel E. Garrison (A7207)
SNELL & WILMER LLP.
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Broadway Center
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 237-1900
Facsimile:
(801)237-1950

FILES fi!S7H!C7CaunT
Third Judicial District

JUL

7 1997

SALT LAKE CCONTY
OaputyClof.:

Attorneys for Defendant David Knudson dba Knute IV, LLC

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ATTORNEYS'TITLE GUARANTEE FUND,
INC., a Colorado corporation, and EDWARD
ROLLINS and SHANEN ROLLINS aka
SHANEN DAVIS, individuals,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

;
])
;)
])

ORDER OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
DAVID KNUDSON

]
]

RAUL ALVA, ELAINE ALVA, DAVID
]
KNUDSON, dba KNUTE IV, LLC,
])
individuals, and GUARANTY NATIONAL
]
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Utah corporation,;)
Defendants.

Civil No. 960903326CV
Judge Frank G. Noel

]

On December 19, 1996, Plaintiffs Attorney's Title Guarantee Fund, Inc. and Edward and
Shanen Rollins (the "Plaintiffs"), filed a Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiffs' Motion"),
seeking judgme^ against Defendant David Knudson. On January 21, 1997, Knudson filed a CrossGARRTDVSir*

Motion for Summary Judgment ("Knudson's Cross-Motion") and a consolidated Memorandum
in Opposition to Plaintifis' Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Knudson's CrossMotion for Summary Judgment ("Knudson's Supporting Memorandum").
On January 30, 1997, Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to Defendant's Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment. On January 30, 1997, and again on January 31, 1997, counsel for Plaintiffs
filed a Rule 56(f) Affidavit, indicating his need to conduct discovery on certain issues prior to
Knudson's Cross-Motion being submitted for decision. Before briefing was completed on
Knudson's Cross-Motion, a hearing was held on February 7,1997 on Plaintiffs' Motion. Based on
Plaintiffs' counsel's Rule 56(f) Affidavit, the Court deferred consideration of Knudson's CrossMotion until after Plaintiffs had been given an opportunity to conduct limited discovery. The Court
also denied Plaintiffs' Motion without prejudice.
Between February 7, 1997, and May 21, 1997, a period of 103 days, counsel for Plaintiffs
conducted no discovery. On May 21, 1997, Knudson's counsel submitted a Renewed Notice to
Submit for Decision, notifying the Court that over 90 days had passed without any discovery being
propounded by the Plaintiffs, and renewing Knudson's Cross-Motion that he was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. On May 28, 1997, counsel for Plaintiffs filed another Rule 56(f)
affidavit which was identical in wording to the Rule 56(f) affidavits previously filed. The Court
reviewed the file, found good cause for the entry of summary judgment and entered a Minute Entry
on May 29, 1997 granting Knudson's Cross-Motion for the reasons stated in Knudson's Supporting

GARRISD\SLC\45633.1
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Memorandum. For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown; and in accordance with this
Court's May 29,1997 Minute Entry,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 56 U.RC.P., this Court finds that there
are no genuine issues of material fact and that Knudson is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Accordingly, all claims of Plaintiffs against Knudson are hereby dismissed with prejudice and onthe
merits, costs to be determined pursuant to Rule 54 upon entry of final judgment herein.
DATED this

""]

day o&ane^997.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABfcrFRAl^K G. NOEL
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

GARR1SD\SIXU563:!
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Attorney's Title Guarantee Fund, Inc.,
a Colorado corporation and Edward
Rollins and Shanen Rollins, a/k/a
Shanen Davis, individuals,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
Raul Alva, Elaine Alva, David Knudson,
d/b/a Knute IV, LLC individuals, and
Guaranty National Insurance Company,
a Utah corporation,
Defendants-

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

MINUTE ENTRY

CASE NO: 960903326 CV
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL

:
:
:
:

The court has reviewed the plaintiffs' Motion to Set Aside the Summary Judgment. The
grounds for the motion is that the summary judgment was entered as a result of plaintiffs'
excusable neglect. The only excusable neglect referred to, that the court can determine, is that
»

plaintiffs were unaware of deadlines that had been set for submission of the papers in connection
with the Motion for Summary Judgment. This appears to the court to be the heart of plaintiffs'
claim. The deadlines referred to presumably are the deadlines which are clearly stt out in the
court's rules, Rule 4-501, C.J.A.. The court feels that this is an insufficient basis to set aside
the entry of the summary judgment and therefore will deny the motion.

ATTORNEYS' V. ALVA

Counsel for defendants
Dated ±is3£__

PAGE TWO

is to prepare an appropriate order.

day o f

September, 1997.

Frank G. Noel
District Court Judge

ATTORNEYS'V. ALVA
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MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry,
postage prepaid, to the following this cr>4c7day of September, 1997.
Thor B. Roundy
Attorney for Plaintiff
230 South 500 East, Suite 270
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Cameron M. Hancock
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorney for Defendants
P. O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Mark O. Morris
Daniel E. Garrison
SNELL & WILMER
Attorney for Defendant Knudson
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Broadway Center
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

CL^^;

/fjd«i^

FILED DISTRICT COURT
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Mark O. Monis (A4636)
Daniel E. Garrison (A7207)

OCT 2 6 1997

SNELL&WTLMERLLP.

flMESpK

SALT

111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Broadway Center
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
(801) 237-1900
Facsimile:
(801) 237-1950

BY DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendant David Knudson dba Knute IV, LLC

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ATTORNEYS'TITLE GUARANTEE FUND,
INC., a Colorado corporation, and EDWARD
ROLLINS and SHANEN ROLLINS aka
SHANEN DAVIS, individuals,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

]
])
])
]}

ORDER DENYING
RULE 60(b) MOTION, AND
GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE

]
]

RAUL ALVA, ELAINE ALVA, DAVID
]
KNUDSON, dba KNUTE IV, LLC,
]i
individuals, and GUARANTY NATIONAL
]
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Utah corporation, ])
Defendants.

Civil No. 960903326CV
Judge Frank G. Noel

]

On May 29, 1997, this Court issued a Minute Entry granting the Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment filed by Defendant David Knudson dba Knute IV, LLC ("Knudson"). In response to
Knudson's proposed Order of Summary Judgment in Favor of David Knudson, filed on June 9,
1997, Plaintiffs /
1ARRJSD"

- =v's Title Guaranty Fund, Edward Rollins and Shanen Rollins (collectively,

"Plaintiffs"), through their counsel, Thor B. Roundy, filed an "Objection to Defendant's Proposed
Order of Summary Judgment in Favor of David Knudson; Motion for Reconsideration and to Set
Discovery Deadlines," dated June 13,1997. In a Minute Entry dated July 8,1997, this Court rejected
Plaintiffs' arguments for reconsideration and noted that it had signed the Order of Summary
Judgment in Favor of David Knudson on July 7, 1997.
On or about September 9, 1997, counsel for Plaintiffs filed a "Rule 60(B) Motion to Set
Aside Summary Judgment," and supporting memorandum ("Rule 60(b) Motion"); a "Motion for
Leaveto File Amended Complaint," and supporting memorandum ("Motion to Amend"); a "Motion
for Summary Judgment," and supporting memorandum ("Summary Judgment Motion"); the
affidavits of Brian Coleman, Karen James and Thor B. Roundy, apparently submitted in support of
either the Motion for Summary Judgment or the Motion to Amend Complaint ("Affidavits"); and
"Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents, and Requests for
Admissions to Defendant David Knudson" ("Discovery Requests"). In response, Knudson filed a
memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs Motion, and moved to strike the remaining pleadings and
requests concurrently filed therewith. Plaintiff filed a reply brief and a notice to submit the matter
for decision.
Having reviewed the memorandafiledwith the court, and considering the procedural history,
including this Court's already having considered and denied Plaintiffs Reconsideration Motion;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) Motion is DENTED, and Plaintiffs'
Motion to Amend, Summary Judgment Motion, Affidavits and

GARRISDVSLO05! 587.01

?

Discovery Requests are STRICKEN for the
reason that Defendant David Knudson
is not (and was
not at the time the aforementioned documents were filed)
a party to this action.
DATED this £?ft

S- day of October, 1997.

BY THE COURT

Honorable F;
Third District

GAJUUSDVSLOOJ1587.01
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the j p ^ 3 3 day of September, 1997,1 served a true and accurate copy
of the foregoing [PROPOSED] ORDER DENYING RULE 60(b) MOTION, AND GRANTING
MOTION TO STRIKE upon the following named persons by hand delivery to:
THOR B. ROUND Y, ESQ.
230 SOUTH 500 EAST, SUITE 270
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 34102
and by first class mail to:
CAMERON M. HANCOCK, ESQ.
RAY, QUTNNEY & NEBEKER
79 SOUTH MAIN STREET, SUITE 400
P.O. BOX 45385
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84145

$sn/r/tf?^£
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§§ 1152 to 1213.
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218.
A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to liability against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d
1070.
Appealability of order setting aside, or refusing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d
1272.
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and
hearing as to determination of amount of damages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586.

Opening default or default judgment cli
to have been obtained because of attor
mistake as to time or place of appear
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A L]
1255.
Failure to give notice of application fori
fault judgment where notice is required
by custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383.
Failure of party or his attorney to aj
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303.
Default judgments against the United Sta
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of \
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190.
Key Numbers. — Judgment «=> 92 tojJ§H

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterch
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after>
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after servicS
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or witlwS
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all orlSI
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim?!
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any tanf
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment m 1
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at lc
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior jbp^
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought aha
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories!
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that thereiy
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is eritifleoRl
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutor
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although therefj
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under thigjj
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, sn|
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantialjt
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controvei
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without]
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damageus
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings JtoT]
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. SupftUj
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, s h a l l H
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forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
OTftirtheraffidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
6J otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
* (0 When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
^Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rul« 56, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Contempt generally,
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Affidavit*.
—Contents.
—Corporation.
—Experts.
-^consistency with deposition.
i K ? * ° f °PP osin S affidavits.
—nesting on pleadings.
—Objection.
"^Sufficiency.
TT^Jfcarsay and opinion testimony.
• W " ^ g Pleadings.
S a W * defenses
.-Verified pleading.
^ S S * o f right to contest.
^"•^unavailable.
1 2 2 * ^ 6 defense.
| o interrogatories.

mft. affected

party.

Improper party plaintiff.
Issue of fact.
—Notice.
—Corporate existence.
—Deeds.
—Lease as security.
Judicial attitude.
Motion for new trial.
Motion to dismiss.
Motion to reconsider.
Notice.
—Provision not jurisdictional.
—Waiver of defect.
Procedural due process.
Purpose.
Scope.
Summary judgment improper.
—Damage to insured vehicle.
—Dispersal of interest.
—Findings by court.
—Foreclosure of trust deeds.
—Fraud or duress.

'"ade in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845.
m
Authority of state court to order jury trial in
ivil case where jury has been waived or not
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041.
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on
L e a l , 38 A.L.R.4th 1170.
jury trial waiver as binding on later state
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747.
Court reporter's death or disability prior to

Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness —
modern cases, 96 A.L.R. Fed. 541.
Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of damages for personal injury or death in actions under Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USCS
§§ 51 et seq.) — modern cases, 97 A.L.R. Fed.
189.
Key Numbers. — New Trial <s=> 13 et seq.,
110, 116.

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 60, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion
to set aside judgment, § 21-1-5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

"Any other reason justifying relief."
—Default judgment.
—-Impossibility of compliance with order.
—Incompetent counsel.
—Lack of due process.
—Merits of case.

—Mistake or inadvertence.
—Mutual mistake.
—Real party in interest.
Appeals.
Clerical mistakes.
—Computation of damages.
—Correction after appeal.
—Date of judgment.

